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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM

H.

DODD *

Senate Bill 615, known as the Community Property Bill, was approved by
Governor James H. Duff on July 7, 1947, and became effective September 1, 1947.
In a statement issued at the time the law was signed Governor Duff said: "I am
not unaware that such a radical change in the law of Pennsylvania will cause some
confusion and will be the cause of considerable litigation. But the fact that
$100,000,000 will be saved to the taxpayers of the Commonwealth is such a vast
amount of money, particularly at a time the taxes are generally so onerous, that
I believe it is in the interest of the people of the Commonwealth to approve the
bill and run the risk of the confusion that will be caused by the new legislation." 1
Thus it appears that the act is primarily a tax minimizing measure in the guise of
property legislation.
It is the purpose of the writer to make a general examination of the provisions of the statute to determine as far as possible the characteristics of community property as a new species of co-ownership. The significance of this law
from the standpoint of its effect upon taxation is considered elsewhere in this
number of the Dickinson Law Review.'
If this statute were aimed at reforming our property laws, it would mark a
drastic change of policy. For a century legislation has been directed at bringing
the wife into a position of equality with the husband so far as independent enjoyment and control of her separate property is concerned irrespective of how or
when it was acquired by her. By the series of statutes frequently referred to as
the Married Women's Property Acts and revision of the laws pertaining to decedents' estates this objective has been almost attained. For those things which
either the husband or the wife acquires during the marriage by other than certain
excepted means the community property law substitutes the policy of equal and
joint ownership of such gains with the right of control generally in the one in
whose name title to the thing stands as statutory agent for the marital community.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
This concept of ownership by the husband and wife of the marital gains,
sometimes described as the ganancial system, is said to have been originated by
the Germanic tribes one of which - the Visigoths - introduced it into Spain.5
*A. B., Dickinson College; L. L. B., Dickinson School of Law; Professor, Dickinson School of
Law; Member, Luzerne County Bar.
1 The Bulletin, Wed., July 9, 1947, p. 1
ZSee p. 1, supra
SDeFuniak, W. Q., Principles of Community Property, (1943), Vol. 1,p. 25
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Its recognition in the written code known as the Fuero Juzgo of 693 A. D. is
some indication of its antiquity. 4 From Spain it was carried to Spanish territories
in North America. In the more thickly settled areas it took root and continued
to exist in varying forms after those regions became states. The old community
property states were Arizona, California, Idaho, Lousiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas and Washington. 5 In California, Nevada and Texas the system was perpetuated by the state constitutions.8 In the other states it was continued by statutes
of different degrees of comprehensiveness and similarity to the Spanish system.
Stimulated by the desire of securing for its citizens the same favorable federal income tax position as that enjoyed by husbands and wives in respect to their
community income in neighboring community property states, Oklahoma by
statute in 1939 adopted an elective community system.7 This elective feature resulted in a decision by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner vs. Harmon8 denying that a husband and wife who had elected to come
under the statute could file returns showing half the income produced by the
husband as the wife's in accordance with the practice authorized in the original
community property jurisdictions. In 1945 the Oklahoma legislature enacted a
community property law patterned after the Texas statutes 9 applicable to husbands and wives generally. The Pennsylvania act copied this statute with only
minor changes. 10 Michigan, Nebraska and Oregon have also adopted community
property by recent statutes. 11 None of these new community property statutes
have received judicial interpretation at the time of this writing with the exception of the Oklahoma act of 1939 which received its first and only construction
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Harmon vs. Oklahoma Tax Commission."
No precedent is available to determine what will be the result of the impact of a
community property statute such as that adopted in Pennsylvania upon the law
of a state theretofore following the common law doctrines of property.
SEPARATE PROPERTY
The first and second sections of the Pennsylvania community property law
define separate property of the husband and wife respectively. Separate property
is the same for either spouse and consists of the following: (1) all real and
4ibid, p. 72
ibid, p. 72

Gibid, p. 72
732 Okla. St. Ann. 51 et seq.; DeFuniak. supra n. 3, Vol. 2, appendix V, p. 588

8323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, (1944), reversing 139 F. 2d 211
PLentz, B. V., Text of the New Community Property Law and an Analysis of the Basic Income
Tax Problems Arising Under the Law, (1947), p. 6
1OHouse Bill 218, Twentieth Legislature of the State of Okla,, 1945; Fiduciary Review, Aug.,
1947, p. 3. Chief differences of the Pennsylvania statute are in section 5 and in absence of
provisions of Oklahoma statute dealing with act of 1939.
"lCommunity Property and Federal Income Taxes, Commerce Clearing House, Inc., (September,
1947), sec. 8953, p. 7
12118 P. 2d 205 (1941)
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personal property owned or claimed by either spouse prior to marriage or the
effective date of the statute whichever is later; (2) all property acquired after marriage or the effective date of the Act by gift, devise or descent; (3) compensation
received for personal injuries. Section 6 establishes a presumption that all funds
on deposit in any banking institution are the separate property of the spouse in
whose name they stand regardless of who made the deposit. Section 9 makes
every transfer of community property from one spouse to the other operate to
divest the subject transferred of "every claim or demand as community property"
and to vest it in the grantee as separate property. Section 10 provides that upon
dissolution of the marriage by decree each spouse becomes vested with an undivided one-half interest in the community property as tenant in common. Section 15 contains a similar description of the interest which the surviving spouse
has in the community property after community debts have been paid and onehalf of the community property remaining has been transferred to the personal
representative of the deceased spouse - the interest of the survivor shall be that
of a tenant in common. The implication of the two latter sections is that dissolution of the marriage by decree or death transforms the interest of the divorced
or surviving spouse into separate property in the form of a tenancy in common.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
By section 3 "all property acquired by either the husband or wife during
marriage and after the effective date of this act except that which is the separate
property of either as hereinabove defined shall be deemed the community or
common property of the husband and wife". The word "deemed" may have
the connotation of finality or of presumption. It would seem to have been used
here in the latter sense. This section also creates a presumption that at the dissolution of the marriage all the "effects which the husband and wife possess ....
shall be regarded as common effects or gains". The nature and extent of the
interest of either spouse in the actual or presumed community property is described
as being a vested undivided one-half interest.
PURCHASES DURING MARRIAGE
Because the act reads that property acquired by either during the marriage
shall be "deemed" community property, a question arises as to the status of something purchased during the marriage by a spouse who uses separate property or
the funds obtained by the mortgaging or pledging of separate property to pay
the purchase price. So long as the purchaser can trace his separate property or
its proceeds into the acquisition it is regarded as a transmutation and that which
is acquired is separate property.'$ By the same reasoning things purchased
14
When
through the use of community property become community property.
18DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, p. 204; Huber vs. Huber, 167 P. 2d 708, (Cal., 1946); In re
Abdale's Estate, 170 P. 2d 918, (Cal., 1946)'
14DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. I. p. 205
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both community funds and separate funds are used to make the purchase, the
thing acquired is owned by the community and the spouse whose separate funds
were used in the same proportions as the amount of each type of fund invested
bears to the entire purchase price.15 It has been held that the commingling of
separate and community property in such a way that neither can be separated
results in the mass being regarded as community property until the spouse claiming part is separate property establishes his claim. 1 6 Anything purchased with
such commingled property likewise becomes community property. 17 These principles accent the importance of each spouse's keeping complete records of his
separate property and transactions concerning it.
EARNINGS AND INCOME FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY
Under the definition of community property in section 3 all earnings of
either the husband or the wife which are not owned or claimed prior to marriage
or the effective date of the act, whichever is later, become community property.
The language of this section is broad enough to include acquisitions in the form
of rents, profits, interest and dividends received by a spouse from his or her
separate property after marriage and the effective date of the act. That it was
the intention to make such gains community property is confirmed by section 4.
In allocating the right of control of community property between the spouses,
section 4 specifies that the wife's rights of management and control shall extend
to the community property consisting of her earnings and income from her separate property. The act makes no mention whatsoever of the status of income
from the husband's separate property, but it is unthinkable that any distinction
between the husband and wife was intended in this respect.
It was the rule under the Spanish system that all income and profits from
separate property of either spouse received during the marriage was community
property. However, all the original community property states except Idaho,
Louisiana and Texas have abandoned this view and have treated income from
separate property as separate property.18 It is significant that under the Texas
law and the Oklahoma act of 1939, both of which are worded almost exactly
as the Pennsylvania act, the conclusion has been that the income from separate
property during the marriage is community property.1 9 But it should be remembered that Texas has always followed the rules of the Spanish community system,
and that the Oklahoma act of 1939 was thought to be constitutional because of
20
elective provisions.
15ibid.,

p, 207; woodrome vs. Burton, 154
6
1 Walker Smith Co. vs. Coker, 176 S. W.
2d 608, (Cal., 1946)
1'Walker Smith Co. vs. Coker, supra n. 16;
King vs, Prudential Ins. Co., 125 P. 2d
8

1 DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol.
19 Harmon vs. Oklahoma Tax
1876, Art. XVI, sec. 15;
20Harmon vs. Oklahoma Tax

S. W. 2d 665 (Tex.. 1941)
2d 1002, (Tex., 1944); Buehler vs. Buehler, 166 P.
McElyea vs. McElyea, 163 P. 2d 635, (N. M., 1945);
282, (Wash., 1942)

1, p. 181
Commission 118 P. 2d 205 (Okla., 1941); Texas Constitution of
DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 2, Appendix V, p. 599
Commissidn, Supra n. 19
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Constitutional objections are apparent to the construction that the rents, profits
and income from separate property of either spouse received during marriage are
community property. The Pennsylvania courts have stated that the grant of the
right to income and profits of a thing is the grant of the,thing itself. 21 Although
as the sovereign the state has the power to regulate the incidents of the marital
relationship,2 2 it has been pointed out that the right to income from property does
23
not depend on marital status
APPRECIATION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
The Pennsylvania statute contains no specific provision governing the status
of increases in value of separate property during marriage. The Oklahoma act
of 193924 like the Texas prototype 5 awarded the increase of all lands which
were separate property to the spouse who owned them, but this provision does
not appear in the Oklahoma act of 1945. Under the Spanish system increases in
6
the value of separate property belonged to the spouse whose property it was.2
The Texas courts have distinguished increases in value of both land and personalty
due to community resources, i.e. the employment of community property or labor
and industry of either spouse, from increases due to other causes. 2 7 If the increase is not the result of the application of community resources it has generally
been held to be separate property. When community property is used for the
purpose of making an improvement upon separate realty of one of the spouses
or to discharge a lien upon such separate property, the title to the improvement
follows the realty and is separate property, but the community obtains the right
to be reimbursed from the separate property of the spouse thereby benefited. 28
In Harmon vs. Oklahoma Tax Commission the court held the profit realized by
the sale of an oil and gas lease which was the husband's separate property was
29
his separate income and taxable as such.

21Caldwell vs. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, (1858)
22

Fearon vs. Treanor, 5 N. F. 2d 815, (N. Y. 1936) ; Act of 1935 P. L. 450, (48 P S 170) et seq.,
abolishing actions for breach of promise and alienation of affections held constitutional in
McMullen vs. Nannah, 49 D. & C. 516, (1943)
23
Fiduciary Review, August, 1947, pp. 3, 4
24

supra n. 7
Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes, 1936, Art. 4613, 4614; DeFuniak, supra n. 3. Vol. 2,

25

Appendix V, p. 607
26DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, p. 187
2"ibid., p. 189. See cases and comment in note 67
281rown vs. Brown, 119 P. 2d 938, (Ariz., 1941); Wheeland vs. Rodgers, 124 P. 2d 816, (Cal.,
1942), 77 A. L. R. 1015, Annotation: Right of Community to Reirmbursement for Community
29

Property Applied to Improvement of or Discharge of Liens on Separate Property of One of
the Spouses, at p. 1021
Supra n. 12
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ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL
a. Separate Property
Section 4 of the Pennsylvania community property law provides that each
spouse shall have the right of management and control and power of disposal of
his or her separate property. But section 5 states that all real estate which is the
separate property of either shall not be sold, encumbered or otherwise disposed
of except in the manner provided by law prior to the effective date of this act.
The only change made by the statute so far as separate property is concerned is
that the income therefrom is apparently conceived to be community property.
b. Community Property
In most community property systems the husband is the one who has the
management and control of all the common property .during the marriage.8 0 This
is the rule under the Texas law.31 The Pennsylvania act departs materially in
this respect by investing the wife with the management, control and power of
disposition of the part of the community property consisting of her earnings, the
income from her separate property and all common property the" title to which
stands in her name. 82 The husband is given corresponding rights and powers
over the community property not subject to the control of the'wife. This would
include his earnings, income from his separate property, and community property
the title to which stood in his name or in their joint names. According to section
5 community realty "shall not be sold, encumbered or otherwise disposed of except in the manner provided by law prior to the effective date of this act". This
provision appears curious inasmuch as there was no prescribed mode in Pennsylvania for disposing of community realty prior to this act.
Under the following circumstances the husband or wife may by petition to
the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which they reside (no provision is
made for the case where husband and wife reside in different counties) to be
substituted for the other spouse in the management, control and disposition of
the community property then under the control of the other spouse: when the
other is non compos mentis, has been convicted of a felony, has been sentenced
to imprisonment for a period of more than one year, is an habitual drunkard or
for any other reason is incapacitated to manage the community property. In
addition the wife may so petition whenever the husband has abandoned her and
left her without support.3 3 Service shall be had as in actions of assumpsit.3 4
When judgment is entered awarding management and control of the community
property to the petitioner, it shall be recorded in the office of the prothonotary
8ODeFuniak, supra n. 3, p. 322
3
lVernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes, 1936, Art. 4619, sec. 1, DeFuniak, supra n.
Appendix V, p. 608
32
Pennsylvania Community Property Act of 1947, No. 550, sec. 4
33ibid., sec. 1I
34ibid., sec. 12

3,

Vol. 2,
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of the court of Common Pleas of the county where the community property affected thereby is situated which record shall be notice. 5
The husband and wife each holds a vested undivided one-half interest in
the community property irrespective of in whose name the title stands. If this
ownership exists more than in name only, the non-managing spouse should be
enabled to institute legal proceedings for the protection of his interest against
unreasonable or wasteful acts by the managing spouse which threaten its destruction. The statute imposes no limits on the exercise of the power of disposition
or management. Yet as to the other spouse the one authorized to act for the
community must be regarded as a statutory agent or trustee. No provision is
made for the removal of this statutory agent or trustee even though he acts
wantonly or maliciously. One spouse may petition to be substituted as manager
when the other has been convicted of a felony or other of the enumerated grounds
exist, but both will have to suffer losses resulting from incompetence of the managing spouse. The determination of the rights and duties in this vital matter
has been left to the courts.
In other community property systems it has been recognized that the spouse
having the power of management and disposition of the community assets must
not exercise the power in fraud of the rights of the other spouse although the
passive spouse must share the losses from the other's management so long as no
bad faith is involved.8 6 The burden of proving the fraudulent intent rests upon
the spouse questioning the exercise of the power, 7 but fraud has been implied
from the nature of the disposition when the transfer was for inadequate consideration or was a large gift made without good reason 3 8

A further question in connection with the rights of the passive spouse arising
out of an improper disposition of community property by the managing spouse
is against whom the remedy should be sought. Should the injured spouse be
compelled to exhaust remedies against the managing spouse and his separate

property before proceeding against the transferee, or may the injured spouse elect
to proceed against either? The Spanish law required the wife (the husband
always being the manager) to resort to the husband first when the subject matter
improperly disposed of was fungibles or intangibles, but in other instances she
could proceed first against the transferee. 39 Assuming the action is instituted
against the other spouse, will this be an authorized proceeding between husband
and wife within the act of 1893 as amended?40 It would be possible to hold that

the spouse's interest.in community property under the community property act is
"separate property" under the act of 1893.

3bibid.. sec. 14

3GDeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, pp. 339, 340
37ibid., p. 367

:"Sibid., p. 338

39ibid., p. 363
401893 P. L. 344, sec. 3 as amended by act of 1913 P. L. 14, (48 P S

i)
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Until there have been judicial interpretations of the Pennsylvania statute
gifts of community property by the managing spouse without the other's consent
will be highly questionable. There is no provision concerning this subject in the
Pennsylvania law. The California statute, though it vests the power of disposal
over all community personalty exclusively in the husband, provides that no gifts
shall be made by him without the written assent of the wife. If such gifts are
made the wife may have them set aside in their entirety during marriage but
only as to one-half after the death of the husband. 41 This is the view of Washington in absence of statute. 42 However, it has been held that reasonable gifts
of community property by the spouse having the power of disposition may be
made so long as they are not pursuant to a design to defraud the other spouse.
This appears to be the rule in Arizona, Louisiana, Nevada and Texas.' 8 The
adoption of this latter view in Pennsylvania would permit either spouse to make
gifts of community property under his control.
The status of gifts is of the utmost importance in regard to life insurance.
Payment of premiums on insurance policies issued to the husband or the wife in
which other persons are named beneficiaries out of earnings or other community
property after the effective date of the act may lead to claims by the surviving
spouse to a share of the proceeds as community property. 4
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
The powers of management, control and disposition which each spouse is
given over community property by section 4 do not extend to making dispositions
by will. The will of either spouse may affect only the half interest in the community assets remaining after all community debts have been paid and the community affairs settled by the surviving spouse. When the deceased is intestate,
half of the community assets so remaining shall be transferred by the survivor
to the personal representative of the decedent who shall distribute them as other
property of the decedent's estate "under the laws of descent and distribution". 45
TRANSFERS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
a. To Third Persons
It would seem that community personalty will be transferable in the same
manner as separate personalty of the same kind by the spouse exercising the power
of disposition. But the act provides in section 5 that community realty "shall
41Lynn vs. Herman, 165 P. 2d 54, (Cal., 1946)
42Occidental Life Ins. Co. vs. Powers, 74 P. 2d 27, 114 A. L. R. 531, (Wash., 1937); Small vs.
Bartyzell, 177 P. 2d 391, (Wash., 1947) ; Hanley vs. Most, 115 P. 2d 933, (Wash., 1941)
43DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, p. 354
4
4 Small vs. Bartyzell, supra n. 42; 114 A. L. R. 531. See annotation at p. 545: Application of
Community Property System to Problems Arising in Connection with Life Insurance Policy.
Supplemented 168 A. L. R, 342; 64 A. L. R. 466 at 495 Gift by Husband as Fraud on Wife.
46PenngylVania Cbmmunity Property Law, Act of 1947, No. 550, gec.
15
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not be sold, encumbered or otherwise disposed of except in the manner provided
by law prior to the effective date of the act." This must signify the community
realty shall be mortgaged, leased, aliened in the same way individual or separate
realty was prior to this statute since no community realty existed in Pennsylvania
prior to this act. If this inference is correct, community realty standing in the
husband's name may be leased, conveyed or mortgaged to third persons without
the joinder of the wife. Community realty standing in the wife's name will require the joinder of the husband in conveyances to third persons to pass valid
title. 46 Under the act of 194517 it would not be necessary that the husband join
in a mortgage given by the wife upon community realty standing in her name.
Failure to secure the joinder of the husband in a conveyance of community realty
standing in the wife's name to a third person would pass a voidable title in view
of the language appearing in the decision of Haines Trust. 8 Further, it would
seem that the failure to obtain the joinder of the other spouse in any conveyance
of community realty would cause the grantee to take subject to the nonjoining
spouse's inchoate statutory dower or curtesy in the granting spouse's undivided
one-half. The Pennsylvania community property law does not contemplate any
inheritance or distribution of the deceased spouse's community realty different
from that of the deceased spouse's separate realty. The surviving spouse's share
in community realty aliened without his or her joinder presumably will be the
same as the shaTe in the realty of which the other died separately seised. In the
community property states which follow in the Spanish tradition no rights comparable to common law dower or curtesy or their statutory equivalent are recog49
nized.
b. Transfers Between Husband And Wife
Section 9 specifically covers transfers of community property by either spouse
to the other. Either may give or sell his existing community property directly to
the other. The effect of every conveyance from one to the other of community
assets is to divest the property of every claim or demand as community property
and make it the separate property of the transferee except as to equities existing
in favor of the creditors of the transferor at the time of the transfer.
A problem arises when either transfers community property to himself and
the other. Because this is not within the letter of the act, it is arguable
that the transfer does not divest the subject matter of every claim and demand
as community property. If it does not, does it remain community property in
their joint names and under the control and disposition of the husband? Or is
the effect a gift to the other of one-half of the transferor's undivided one-half
interest which becomes the separate property of the other as a tenant in common
46Act of 1893, P. L. 344, sec. 1,2, as amended by Act of 1945 P. L. 625,
7

4' supra n. 46
48356 Pa. 10 (1947) and cases cited therein
49
DeFuniak, supra n, 3, Vol. 1, p. 568

sec. ,1,2,(48 PS 31, 32)
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with the community as to the other three quarters in which the husband has only
a one-quarter interest? Another possibility is that the transfer from either to
himself or herself and the other converts the interest into a tenancy by the
entireties.
TRANSFER OF SEPARATE PROPERTY TO COMMUNITY
No express provision is made for converting separate property into community property. Either spouse may receive for the community, but for that which
is received to be considered community property it must be acquired other than
by gift, devise, descent. Any separate property which either transfers to the other
gratuitously would be separate property still. Any separate property which either
transfers gratuitously to himself and the other would be separate property in
whatever cotenancy was created. One method available for converting separate
property into community property appears to be that of using separate
property of one spouse to purchase community property from himself or the
other. That which is purchased becomes separate property and that which was
consideration for the purchase becomes community property.
Another possible way of making separate property into community property
and vice versa is that of agreement between the spouses. Pennsylvania has enforced antenuptial50 and postnuptial 5' agreements varying property rights of the
spouses. Most of the "old" community property states have by statute recognized
the validity of antenuptial and postnuptial agreements which provide for owner52
ship by the spouses different from that under their rules of community property.
These agreements may convert the separate property of either into community
property6 3 or community property into separate property 54 although there is some
difference of opinion whether the agreement of the spouses will itself work the
transmutation of separate property into community property. 54a The Washington
statute authorizes agreements between the spouses at any time concerning the
status of community property owned or to be acquired to take effect upon the
death of either.55 Texas sanctions only antenuptial contracts.5 6 It has been held
under the Texas provision that community property cannot be changed into separate property by virtue of antenuptial agreements before the property comes into
existence. 67 The Pennsylvania act is silent on the subject of agreements. The
5

oCoanes Est., 310 Pa. 138, (1933) ; Clark's Est., 303 Pa. 538, (1931) 0 Holwig Est., 348 Pa. 71,
(1943); Groff's Est., 341 Pa. 105, (1941)
B Fennell's Est., 207 Pa. 309, (1904); Haendler's Est.. 81 Pa. Super. 168, (1923); Mary Ann
Slagle's Appeal, 294 Pa. 442, (1928); Inskipt's Estate, 324 Pa. 406, (1936); Zlotziver vs.
Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299 (1946)
2
5 DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, p. 391, note 44
1

53ibid., pp. 404, 405; Marvin vs. Marvin, 116 P. 2d 151, (Cal., 1941)
54Gage vs. Gage, 138 P. 886, (Wash., 1914) ; Volz vs. Zang, 194 P. 409, (Wash., 1920)
54aMcDonald vs. Lambert, 85 P. 2d 78, (N. M., 1938), 120 A. L. R. 264
S5Remington's Revised Statutes, 1932, sec. 6894, DeFuniak, supra h. 3, Vol. 2, Appendix V, p. 615
56Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes, 1936, Art. 4610; DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 2, Appendix
V, p. 606
57DeFuniak, supra n. 3, Vol. 1, p. 391

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

fact that the interest of each spouse in community property under the Pennsylvania law is a vested undivided one-half interest suggests no reason for the adoption of a different rule concerning the validity of antenuptial and postnuptial
contracts between the spouses. The husband and wife may contract as they
desire concerning their separate property as such. They should be able to do
likewise concerning their community prolerty. The income of property which
has become community property by agreement, assuming such agreements are
valid, may not have the tax advantages of that received from community property
which becomes such by operation of law. 58
LIABILITY OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY TO CREDITORS
Sections 7 and 8 contain the provisions for liability of the community property to creditors. The vital consideration is who has control. That portion of
the community property under the management and control of the wife is "liable
for debts contracted by the wife and for torts of the wife committed in the course
of acquiring, holding or managing such community property but not otherwise." 59
Exactly the same wording is used to describe the liability of that portion of the
community property under the control of the husband. A presumption exists
that "all debts created" by either after marriage and after the effective date of
the act shall be regarded as community debts.
Internal evidence seems to indicate that the word "contracted" as it is used
in section 7 is not used in the technical sense limiting the liability for debts
arising on express or implied agreements but rather in the sense of "incurred"
or "acquired". The reference to "debts created" in the latter part of this section
and in section 8 seems to support this view.
The statute is ambiguous as to whether community property shall be liable
for individual or separate debts "contracted" by the husband or the wife. In this
connection great importance is attached to the rebuttable presumption that all
debts created by either after marriage and after the effective date of the act are
community debts. It seems rather pointless to presume all debts are community
debts if the liability of the community property extends to separate debts.
Greater clarity exists concerning the scope of the liability of the community
property for torts although the test proposed may be somewhat difficult to apply.
It is to be liable for torts of the spouse in control which were "committed in the
course of acquiring, holding or managing such community property".O This is
suggestive of respondeat superior. This intent to circumscribe the tort liability
of the community property strengthens the inference that the liability for debts
was intended to be similarly limited.
58

See remarks concerning "consensual communities" in Commissioner vs. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44,

65 S. Ct. 103, (1944)
59
Pennsylvania Community Property Law of 1947, No. 550, sec. 7
e0ibid
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After stating the community property shall be liable for debts and torts as
above mentioned comes the significant clause - "but not otherwise". Has the
act created a novel immunity for debtors and tortfeasors? It appears, if the above
conclusions as to its meaning are correct, that it has and that this immunity is
partial and temporary for community debts and for liability for torts committed
in the course of acquiring, holding or managing the community property.
It is. a partial immunity for community debts and for what for brevity may
be called community liabilities because the community creditors or claimants are
permitted to resort to only that portion of the community property under
the control of the spouse who is the debtor or tortfeasor. Section 8 seems to
reinforce this interpretation by the following words: "No creditor shall have
recourse to the community property for the payment of debts or liabilities created
by either the husband or the wife except as provided in section seven of this act".
It is submitted that this language is broad enough to embrace community creditors
and tort claimants. The word "creditor" is nowhere defined in the statute.
In the event of the death of one of the community propiietors there is a
provision in section 15 that the survivor in settling community affairs "shall pay
out of the community property except exempt property all debts of the community
whether created by the husband or the wife." 61 This language is capable of being
construed that the survivor shall pay the community debts (tort claims may be
debts for this purpose) out of the community property subject to his control as
well as that which was subject to the control of the decedent. For this reason the
immunity is characterized as being temporary - its duration is limited to the
joint lives of the marital partners. There is no direction concerning the payment
of community debts in the event of dissolution of the marriage other than by
death of one of the spouses.
Confronted with this temporary immunity concerning the community property under the control of the other spouse may a claimant asserting a community
claim resort to the separate property of the spouse who created the debt or liability? There is nothing in the act which forbids this, and some provisions appear to contemplate it. Section 8 concludes with the provision that either spouse
on paying community debts "shall as between themselves charge the same against
community property". This would authorize either spouse to pay a community
debt out of community property under his control or out of his separate property.
If the payment is made out of community property, the interest of each is equally

and automatically depleted in the community property and no further charge will
be necessary as between them.

If the payment is made out of separate property,

the one making the payment is authorized to adjust the matter as between themselves by charging it against the community property. It is not clear whether the
one making the payment out of separate property would be entitled to appropriate
6lltalics supplied
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from the community property as his separate property a thing or sum equal to
the amount of his payment. Possibly only bookkeeping charges are contemplated.
The provision permitting either spouse to charge payment of community
debts against community property may be construed as authorizing a creditor to
subject community property under the control of the spouse not creating the debt.
However, the statute is explicit that the liability of the community property should
not be otherwise than as stated in section 7.
Notwithstanding the creditor is a community claimant it would seem that
he should be able to resort to the separate property of the spouse incurring the
debt for his satisfaction. The fact that the spouse in creating the debt may have
been acting for the benefit of the community, i.e. for himself and the other, should
not render his separate property less liable than it would have been if he were
acting for the exclusive benefit of the other spouse or any third person at the time
the indebtedness arose but not under the control or direction of the other or the
third person. If the debtor spouse is compelled to pay out of his separate property
the means of adjustment as between the spouses is provided by the statute.
May a community creditor reach the separate property of the spouse who
did not participate in the creation of the debt or liability? The act specifically
provides for this in one situation. By section 8 "any creditor may satisfy his claim
or demand out of the community property which was under the management ...
of the spouse incurring the indebtedness or liability at the time the debt or liability was contracted or created and which has been subsequently conveyed or
transferred to the other spouse . . . without proof that the said creditor relied
upon said community property in advancing said credit...." It should be recalled that any community property transferred from one spouse to the other
thereby becomes the separate property of the transferee. This right is given to
"any creditor" which would apparently include community creditors. Third party
purchasers, encumbrancers, creditors or grantees from the spouse to whom the
community property was transferred will prevail over the creditor seeking to reach
the property according to the act.62 Thus, this right may be a very insubstantial
one. The act is so worded that this right would not extend to community property acquired subsequently by the spouse creating the debt or liability and thereafter transferred to the other spouse. Despite this it would seem that the creditor's right to follow the property would exist if the transfer were fraudulently
made.6 31 Another circumstance under which a community creditor may resort to
the separate property of the spouse not creating the debt is when that spouse's
separate property has been improved with community funds. There is some authority that the community creditor may reach the separate property of one spouse

62
3

Pennsylvania Community Property Law of 1947, No. 550, sec. 8
6 Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 1921 P. L. 1045, (39 P S 351 et seq.)
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to the extent of the community's claim for reimbursement from that spouse for
the improvement of the separate property.64
A further question is, may a separate creditor or tort claimant satisfy his demand out of the community property during the marriage? Again the language
of section 7 should be recalled: "That portion of the community property under
the management, control and disposition of the wife (husband)

.

. .

. shall be

liable for debts contracted by the wife (husband) and for torts of the wife
(husband) committed in the course of acquiring, holding or managing such
community property but not otherwise."65 , Assuming that "debts" means community debts, for the reasons mentioned previously, the answer to this question
appears to be that he cannot.
The argument against subjecting the community property, whether it be under the control of the spouse creating the debt or not, to liability for the individual debt or tort of the spouse is the injustice of using the innocent spouse's
community property for the satisfaction of the other's debt or wrongdoing. On
the other hand is the consideration that one should not be permitted to accumulate
assets and keep them immune from claims of his creditors, whether they are
contract or tort claimants.66 The Spanish rule was that community property was
not chargeable for separate debts of a spouse during the marriage. 67 Several of
the original community property states including Texas have taken the position
that the community property is liable for the husband's separate debts but not
for separate debts of the wife.68 In California and Texas it has been held the
entire community property is liable for antenuptial debts of both the husband
and wife on the theory that marriage should not be permitted to become an escape
for debtors. 69 Arizona and Washington have held the community property is
not liable for separate torts of the husband 70 nor for separate debts of the husband. 71 To the suggestion that the community property should at least be liable
for the separate debt or claim to the extent of that spouse's undivided one-half
interest it has been answered that there is no way of knowing what that interest
is until the community is dissolved and the community debts have been paid.
Further it is said the welfare of the family requires the keeping of the common
property intact during the marriage. 72 However, the separate creditor of either
64
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would be able to reach that spouse's interest after the marriage has been dissolved
by death and the status of the survivor and the decedent's estate has become that
of tenants in common in the community assets remaining after satisfaction of
community debts. 73 A judgment entered for a separate debt of the husband is
not a lien upon the community realty in the meantime in Arizona and Washington.7 4 But each spouse has an expectant interest in the community property of
becoming a tenant in common by survivorship or upon dissolution of the marriage. It is arguable that this is a vested interest which could be the subject of a
lien. 75 If this view were adopted, a judgment for a separate debt would be a
dormant lien pending the dissolution of the marriage and would be enforceable
against either interest when it becomes separate after dissolution of the marriage
by death or decree. The community creditors have been held to be entitled to
priority over the separate creditors in the distribution of community assets following dissolution of the marriage. 7 6 Under such a ruling the lien for a separate
debt, if recognized, would be subordinated to the claims of community creditors.
Since the Pennsylvania statute presumes that all debts created by either spouse
after the effective date of the act are community debts, any judgment against
77
either would be presumptively a valid lien against community property.
A qualification of the rule that community property is not liable for separate
torts is recognized in the case of a tort committed by one of the spouses which
benefits the marital community. The community property is liable under these
circumstances. 78 Such a situation may be within the definition of a "community
tort" under the Pennsylvania act - a tort committed in the course of acquiring,
holding or managing the community property.
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